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ABSTRACT 
 
Economic theory posits that financial development eases firm level financing constraints by 
mitigating information asymmetry and contracting imperfections. This paper empirically tests for 
this notion by using firm level data from selected African countries. The sampled firms show 
positive and significant investment cash flow sensitivity coefficients indicating they are financially 
constrained. Financial development is found to have a significant and negative effect on the 
estimated cash flow sensitivity coefficients indicating it reduces firm financial constraints. The 
result further shows that such positive role of financial development is attributed to financial 
intermediary development and not to stock market development. A unique result to the African 
reality is that even firms in countries with high level of financial development are financially 
constrained. This implies the financial development in Africa is too weak and more policy 
attention is needed in this regard. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
conomic theory predicts that financial development improves firms’ access to external finance by 
mitigating information asymmetry and contracting imperfections that exist between the suppliers of 
finance and firms in need of the finance. External funds are generally thought to be costlier than 
internal finance because outsiders have less control over the borrower's actions (see for example, Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) or because they know less about what the borrower will do with the funds (see Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981; Myers and Majluf, 1984).  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) are of the view that the 
problem of firm’s access to finance is more severe in countries with weak financial development and weaker 
institutions that cannot properly protect investor’s interests. In such situations, external finance will be more 
expensive than internal finance, and as a result, firms will be financially constrained. Under the case of financial 
constraints, a firm’s investment (and ultimately growth) is more likely to be limited by the available internal 
resources. 
 
The extant research provides evidence consistent with the theoretical prediction. Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
empirically found that an increase in financial development will induce a bigger impact on industrial growth if the 
industry heavily depends on external finance than if the industry is not naturally a heavy user of external finance. In 
this way, financial development reduces the financing constraints of firms that are dependent on external finance. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) find that firm growth financed by external finance (i.e. long-term external 
debt and equity) is positively associated with the level of a country’s financial development. Love (2003) finds that 
financial development affects firm investments through its impact on firms’ cost of capital. Her results also support 
the view that financing constraints decrease with financial market development. Wurgler (2000) also shows that 
financial development improves the capital allocation process and found that countries with higher levels of 
financial development increase investment more in growing industries and decrease investment more in declining 
industries than financial underdeveloped economies. 
E 
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Despite the above points, Tseng (2012) further suggested that financial development might have some 
adverse effects. He claims that much of financial development is due to financial liberalization and the latter is 
reported to have caused excess volatility and instability in the capital markets (Bae, Chan and Ng, 2004; Stiglitz, 
2004). Such instability may make raising external finance difficult for firms. 
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the notion that financial development eases the financing constraints of 
firms is an unsettled empirical issue. It is against this background this paper investigates the issue using firm level 
data of selected African countries. Most studies in this area focus on developed countries (Love, 2003; Becker and 
Sivandasany, 2010; Baum, Schafer, Talavera, 2011; Islam and Mozumdar, 2007; Khurana, Martin & Pereira, 2006; 
Semenov, 2006).  Since financial development and the financial constraints faced by firms differ across countries 
and regions, an empirical study of African countries might be insightful.  Financial development in Africa is too low 
(see Misati and Nyamongo, 2011; Yartey and Adjasi, 2007; Allen, Otchere and Senbet, 2011) and hence the extent 
of firm financial constraints is perceived to be high.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two discuss the relevant literature which focus on the 
role of financial systems in general, the relative merit of bank based and market based financial system, and a 
glimpse on African financial system. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology section whereas the result and 
discussion are addressed in section four. The last section five concludes the paper. 
 
II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The literature dealing with the issue of whether financial development reduces financial constraints is 
related to broad macro and micro literature that tries to relate financial development with economic growth. At the 
macro-level, the issue of whether financial development helps economic growth is largely a contested one. Early 
economists such as Schumpeter (1911) said finance is helpful for growth whereas Robinson (1952) claims of reverse 
causality. King and Levine (1993) are of the view that finance is still important for economic growth.  
 
At the micro level, Modigliani & Miller (1958) showed that in the world of perfect capital markets, finance 
is irrelevant for investment decisions. Firms can easily substitute external finance for internal finance. However, the 
assumption of a perfect capital market is rather an utopian idea than a practical reality. Frictions due to information 
asymmetry and agency costs create a divergence between the costs of external and internal funds, thereby 
constraining firms in their ability to fund investment projects. As a result, many later studies showed finance is 
relevant for firm investment and thereby aggregate economic growth (see Hubbard, 1998 for a survey). 
 
Overall, even if the finance-growth nexus is a highly debated topic, the dominant view is that finance is 
important for economic growth (see Levine, 2005 for a detailed discussion). Now the question is how finance assists 
growth. One of the channels through which finance helps growth is by reducing firm level financing constraints. 
Specifically financial development mitigates information asymmetry and contracting imperfections, which create a 
wedge between the cost of internal and external finance. Under the situation of relaxed credit constraints, firms can 
invest optimally and bring the needed economic growth. 
 
The Functions of a Financial System 
 
The extensive review by Levine (2005) shows that financial system provide the following key functions, 
which helps for economic growth. They produce information ex ante about possible investments and allocate 
capital; monitor investments and exert corporate governance after providing finance; facilitate the trading, 
diversification, and management of risk; mobilize and pool savings; ease the exchange of goods and services.  The 
first two functions are very important for firms’ access to finance and we discuss them at some length.1  
 
Without intermediaries each investor would face the large fixed cost associated with evaluating firms, 
managers, and economic conditions (Boyd and Prescott, 1986). By improving information on firms, managers, and 
economic conditions, financial intermediaries can accelerate economic growth. Assuming that many entrepreneurs 
                                                
1  For a detailed discussion of the other functions of the financial system, see Levine (2005). 
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solicit capital and that capital is scarce, financial intermediaries that produce better information on firms will thereby 
fund more promising firms and induce a more efficient allocation of capital (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990).  
Allen (1990) also develops models where financial intermediaries arise to produce information on firms and sell this 
information to savers.  
 
Without effective governance, providers of capital may hesitate to extend finance to firms. For instance 
stock markets enable in better governance (align the interest of owners and managers) by linking managerial 
compensation to stock prices (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Further the threat of takeover aligns managerial interest 
with owners in well-developed stock markets (Stein, 1988). 
 
Debt contracts also may lower the cost of monitoring firm insiders and thereby improve corporate 
governance. Using Jensen’s “free cash flow argument”, Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1999) show that debt 
instruments reduce the amount of free cash available to firms. This in turn reduces managerial slack and accelerates 
the rate at which managers adopt new technologies. 
 
Financial intermediaries such as banks also improve governance. Diamond (1984) develops a theoretical 
model in this regard. The intermediary mobilizes the savings of many individuals and lends these resources to firms. 
This “delegated monitor” economizes on aggregate monitoring costs and eliminates the free-rider problem since the 
intermediary does the monitoring for all the investors.  
 
The two basic functions of financial systems in solving information asymmetry and corporate governance 
are very critical to firms’ access to finance. Empirical evidence in this regard i.e. the role of financial development 
in relaxing credit constraints is found by Rajan and Zingales (1998),  Love (2003), Becker and Sivandasany (2010), 
Baum et al. (2011), Islam and Mozumdar (2007), Khurana et al.(2006), Semenov (2006), Tseng (2012). 
 
Furthermore, financial development has other benefits. It facilitates the allocation of credit to profitable 
firms and those firms with good investment opportunities (Bertrand, Schoar and Thesmar, 2007). It also helps the 
firms to grow faster (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998).  
 
In sum it is reasonable to expect that firms in countries with more developed financial systems to be less 
financially constrained than firms in countries with less developed financial systems. With more access to external 
finance, firms will invest optimally. This leads to firms’ growth, which in turn is translated into aggregate economic 
growth. 
 
Bank vs. Market Based Financial Systems 
 
Financial development can be broadly the result of financial intermediary development (such as banks) and 
stock market development. There is a much debate on whether bank based or market based financial systems are 
good for the economy.2 Below is an extract of some of the debates between bank vs. market based financial systems.  
 
The case for a bank-based system: This view argues against the market based financial system. Since stock 
markets reveal information quickly to investors at large, there is a lack of incentive on individual investors from 
devoting resources towards researching firms. Thus greater market development may actually impede incentives for 
identifying innovative projects for faster growth (Stiglitz, 1985). Banks can mitigate the potential disincentives from 
efficient markets by privatizing the information they acquire and by forming long-run relationships with firms 
(Boot, Greenbaum and Thakor, 1993). Banks can make investments without revealing their decisions immediately in 
public markets and this creates incentives for them to research firms, managers, and market conditions with positive 
ramifications on resource allocation and growth. Furthermore, Rajan and Zingales (1999) emphasize that powerful 
banks with close ties to firms may be more effective at exerting pressure on firms to re-pay their debts than atomistic 
markets. 
 
 
                                                
2  For a detailed theoretical and empirical review of this debate, see Levine (2005). 
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On corporate governance, a large literature stresses that markets do not effectively monitor managers 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Takeovers may not be an effective corporate control device because insiders have 
better information than outsiders. Furthermore, stock market liquidity may encourage a myopic investor climate. In 
liquid markets, investor can inexpensively sell their shares, so that they have fewer incentives to undertake careful – 
and expensive – corporate governance (Bhide, 1993). Thus, greater stock market development may hinder corporate 
governance and induce an inefficient allocation of resources according to the bank-based view. 
 
The case for a market-based system: This view argues against the bank based financial system. Once banks 
acquire substantial, inside information about firms, they can extract rents from firms; firms must pay for their greater 
access to capital (Hellwig, 1991). Banks – as debt issuers – also have an inherent bias toward prudence, so that bank 
based systems may confound corporate innovation and growth (Morck and Nakamura, 1999). Allen and Gale (1999) 
also observe that banks may not be effective gatherers and processors of information in new, uncertain situations 
involving innovative products and processes. 
 
Banks are also attacked on effectiveness of corporate governance systems. Bankers act in their own best 
interests, not necessarily in the best interests of all creditors or society at large. For instance, influential banks may 
prevent outsiders from removing inefficient managers if these managers are particularly generous to the bankers 
(Black and Moersch, 1998). 
 
Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that in response to adverse shocks that affect the economy unevenly, 
market-based systems will more effectively identify, isolate, and bankrupt truly distressed firms and prevent them 
from hurting the overall economy than a bank-based system.  
 
Countervailing Views to Bank-Based vs. Market-Based Debate 
 
Some reject the importance of the bank-based versus market-based debate and instead argue that the issue 
is overall financial development, not the particular institutional arrangements that provide financial services to the 
economy (Merton and Bodie, 2004; Levine, 1997). According to this view, the crucial issue for growth is whether 
the economy has access to a well-functioning financial system; the exact composition of the financial system is of 
secondary importance. 
 
On the empirical side, many authors found that those firms working in predominantly market based 
financial system are more constrained than those in bank based financial system (see the findings by Baum et al., 
2011; Semenov, 2006; Tseng 2012; Bond, Elston, Mairesse, and Mulkay, 2003). Tseng (2012) is of the view that 
firms are more constrained in market based financial systems because stock market development may induce excess 
volatility, other risks and add uncertainty to firm financing.  
 
African Financial System 
 
Traditional banking and informal finance dominate the financial system of most African countries.  On 
banking development, the sector is dominated by state owned banks or few large, mainly foreign banks. As part of 
restructuring programs and privatizations, reforms were meant to improve the quality of the banks. Despite this, the 
ratio of private credit to GDP in Africa has been declining steadily and many banks still invest heavily in the safer 
government treasury bills (Allen et al., 2011). Misati & Nyamongo (2011) attributed the declining private credit to 
stringent collateral requirements imposed by banks, information asymmetry and the huge public sector in the 
banking industry, which persisted in some Africa countries even after liberalization.  
 
On stock market development, Yartey  and Adjasi, (2007) are of the view that Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
stock  markets  are  still  small  with  few  listed  companies  and  low  market capitalization. Only South Africa has 
a relatively better-developed stock market.  Besides, Allen et al. (2011) observe that many of African stock markets 
are thin and illiquid.  
 
  
International Business & Economics Research Journal – July/August 2015 Volume 14, Number 4 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 659 The Clute Institute 
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Firm level data is collected from Orbis, a financial database maintained by the Bureau van Djik. On the 
other hand, country level financial development data is collected from the World Bank’s Global Financial 
Development Indicators Database. Six African countries with relatively better financial development are selected. 
These include Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia (Starkey, 2010). Countries with high 
financial development are selected due to data availability concerns.  
 
Firm level data is available for a period of 10 years (2004-2013) from the Orbis website whereas the World 
Bank country level data is available for many years as early as 1960 up to 2011. Due to the need to merge the two 
data sets and after some data cleaning, the useable final dataset is reduced to 7 years (2005-2011), consists of 273 
firms and 1574 firm-year observations. The number of firms-year observations is further reduced to 854 due to the 
use of Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. Consistent with prior studies on investment cash flow 
sensitivity, data is taken from manufacturing companies only. 
 
Egypt and South Africa have the highest number of firms (98 and 94 firms respectively) whereas the rest 
countries are least represented, especially Kenya and Tunisia have only 12 and 6 firms respectively in the final 
dataset. Data is available for an average of 6 years with Tunisia having the full 7 years data from whereas Nigeria 
and Kenya having 5 years data.  
 
The following data cleaning procedures are employed. First, consistent with Baum et al. (2011) firms that 
are engaged in significant mergers and acquisitions, and divestiture activities are removed. The growth rate of assets 
is calculated and if a firm-year observation has a growth rate that exceed 85%, it is trimmed (removed) from the 
dataset. Second, all firm level variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentile, i.e. all outliers are replaced 
with these percentile values. Third, those firms–year observations with negative assets values are dropped. 
 
Financing constraints are measured using the framework of Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) that 
employs the sensitivity of investment to cash flow, with higher sensitivity interpreted as evidence of financing 
constraints. Although such approach is widely used, it is subject to some critics. The notable ones are those by 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) who found that least constrained firms shows higher investment cash flow sensitivity. 
They attribute their result to managerial risk aversion rather than financing constraints. They said, even if least 
constrained firms can raise external finance easily, they still prefer internal finance due to managerial risk aversion 
and irrational behavior. Furthermore, investment and cash flow can be highly related even for the least constrained 
firms due to the agency cost of free cash flow. If managers are not properly monitored, they may waste free cash 
flows in unproductive investment. Despite such caveats, the approach of Fazzari et al. (1988) is still dominant in 
empirical research and used in our paper. 
 
Two models are used to estimate the investment cash flow sensitivity coefficients: the Q model and Euler 
Equation approach (George, Kabirb & Qianc, 2011). The Q model has the advantage of measuring directly the 
expected value of future profitability. But the Q model is not good if stock market prices are not efficient.  The 
commonly used average Q can be an imprecise proxy for the value of an additional unit of new capital (marginal Q). 
Furthermore, the use of Q may overestimate the cash flow sensitivity coefficient because cash flow may contain 
information about investment opportunities that were not captured by Q (Carreira & Silva, 2013). In a model where 
financial frictions are absent, Alti (2003) showed that even if Q is corrected firms exhibit positive ICFS. Guariglia 
(2008) is also of the view that the Q-model suffers from misspecification problems. The Euler equation model 
exploits the relationship between investments in successive time periods and has the advantage that it doesn’t 
require explicit use of future values.  
 
In view of the shortcomings of the Q model, this paper uses the Euler equation approach. Taking insights 
from Carreira & Silva (2013) and Guariglia (2008) and with some modifications, the basic econometric model that 
tests for the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is given by: 
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Where: I is investment measured as the difference between net property, plant and equipment at the end of the 
period and beginning of the period plus depreciation; K is the capital stock or net property, plant and equipment; 
ΔS is the natural logarithm of sales growth; CF is cash flow measured as Net Income plus Depreciation; fi 
represents firm fixed effects, dc represents country dummies and dt represents time dummies. Time dummies are 
added because investment and financing behaviours of firms are also influenced by macro-economic factors 
including the business cycle. Finally, eit is the error term. 
 
To test our main hypothesis of interest i.e. the role of financial development in reducing firm level financial 
constraints, the cash flow variable is interacted with the different financial development measures. These measures 
include overall Financial Development (FD) and its components Stock Market development (STKMKT) and 
Financial Intermediary development (FININT). This interaction terms regression approach and the measures are is 
consistent with Love (2003) and Tseng (2012). 
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FD Measures stands for FD, STKMKT and FININT. The overall financial development (FD) is calculated as the 
sum of STKMKT and FININT. The STKMKT measure in turn is calculated as the average of the standardized 
values of market capitalization to GDP ratio, value traded to GDP ratio and turnover (i.e. value traded to market 
capitalization) ratio. By standardized value it means all the raw data is converted into Z-scores having a mean of 0 
and standard deviation of 1. The FININT measure is calculated as the average of the standardized values of liquid 
liabilities (M3) to GDP ratio and private credit to GDP ratio. Since the use of M3 to GDP ratio may be sometimes 
problematic as a measure of FININT, alternative measure of the ratio of money and quasi money (M2) to GDP ratio 
was used. But the results remain qualitatively similar as M2 and M3 are highly correlated (r = 0.8912, significant at 
5%). 
 
To check the validity of equation 2 results and test a further hypothesis of firms’ financial constraint across 
the different degree of financial development measures, equation 3 is estimated. In this equation, the different 
financial development measures are split into low and high FD (STKMKT) (FININT) based on median values. 
Those firms below the median values are classified as operating in a country with low financial development 
measures and firms above the median values are operating in a country with relatively high financial development 
measures. The median values are 0.24, 0.03 and 0.23 respectively for the FD, STKMKT and FININT measures. 
Then dummy variables are created for these firm classifications as follows. If a firm is operating in country with low 
financial development measures, it is given a code of 1, zero otherwise. This variable is labelled as “low FD, low 
STKMKT and low FININT”. The same procedure is used to create the dummy variable for “high FD, high 
STKMKT and high FININT”. After the dummies are created, they are interacted with cash flow. Equation 3 
captures this sample split econometric specification. 
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FDMeasuresCategory represent the low and high FD(STMKMKT)(FININT) categories.  
 
As to the estimation technique, the system GMM estimator, which is a version of dynamic panel model 
estimators, is used. Previous authors such as Love (2003) and Baum et al. (2011) used such estimators in studying 
the effect of financial development on firm level financing constraints.  
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As Roodman (2009) explains dynamic panel estimators are designed for the following situations, 1) “small 
T, large “ panels meaning few time periods and many individuals; 2) a linear functional relationship; 3) a single left 
hand side variable that is dynamic, depending on its own past realizations; 4) independent variables that are not 
strictly exogenous meaning correlated with past and possibly current realization of the error; 5) fixed individual 
effects; 6) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals but not across them.   
 
There are two kinds of dynamic panel estimators, Difference GMM and System GMM (Roodman, 2009). 
The difference GMM (also called Arellano-Bond estimator) transforms all regressors by first differencing and then 
apply the Generalized Method of Moments technique. The system GMM (Arellano-Bover or Blundell-Bond 
estimator) augments the Arellano-Bond estimators by making an additional assumption that the first difference of 
instrument variables is uncorrelated with the fixed effect. This allows the introduction of more instruments and 
dramatically improves efficiency. It builds a system of two equations, the original equation as well as the 
transformed one through first differencing, and is known as system GMM. 
 
Our data set stratifies most of the criteria listed above to use dynamic panel estimators. Our panel is short 
where there is small T and large N. Our specification is also linear.  Investment is modelled as function of its own 
lag. The fixed effect (within effect) model estimators are inconsistent once lagged regressors are introduced. This is 
because the within model will have the first regressors yit−1 − yi
_
 that  is correlated with the error εit−1 −εi
_
. This 
correlation happens because yit−1  is correlated with εit−1  and hence with εi
_
. Furthermore, instrumental variable 
estimation using lags is not possible because any lag of yit  will be correlated with εi
_
 and hence with εit−1 −εi
_
. By 
contrast, although the first difference estimator is also inconsistent, instrumental variable  estimators of the first 
difference model that use appropriate lag of yit  as instruments do lead to consistent parameter estimates (Cameroun 
and Trivedi, 2009). In our model, some of the explanatory variables such as cash flow are endogenous. Cash flow is 
considered endogenous because both cash flow and investment are simultaneously determined by profitability 
(Islam and Mozmudar, 2007).  
 
As to some of the specification tests used in our estimation, robust standard errors are employed to address 
the issues of heteroskedasticity. Autocorrelation of order 2, AR (2), test is used to check for autocorrelations in first 
difference errors. Two lags of the right hand side variables are used as instruments. The Sargan test of 
overidentifying restriction is used to test for instrument validity. 
 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics is discussed under two section. The first deals with statistics of key variables by 
different degree of financial development and the second deals with statistics of key variables by the sample African 
countries.  
 
Table 1 below presents the descriptive statistics of main variables by different degree of financial 
development. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (Mean) by key variables by financial development 
Variables Cash flow FD STKMKT FININT Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Investment 0.2 0.66 0.5 0.41 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 
Sales growth 0.1 0.18 0.1 0.19 0.1 0.18 0.1 0.18 
Cash flow 0.1 7.81 4 3.98 4 4 4.1 3.91 
Firm-Year (NT) 781 793 703 871 783 791 704 870 
 
High cash flow firms have the highest investment rates and sales growth. Since they are not financially 
constrained, they are expected to invest more. Investment is higher in countries having low FD whereas sales growth 
is higher in countries with higher FD. This possibly indicates production is located in low cost and less developed 
economies whereas the products are sold in relatively developed markets. Cash flow is not different between 
countries with high or low FD. The descriptive statistics of the key variables when samples are split by STKMKT 
and FININT are the same as that of the FD sample split. 
 
Table 2 discuss the descriptive statistics of key variables by the sampled six African countries. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (Mean) of key variables by country 
Country / Variables Investment Sales Growth Cash Flow FD STKMKT FININT NT 
Egypt 0.33 0.13 4.8 -0 -0.14 0.13 585 
Kenya 0.62 0.17 2.89 -2 -1.14 -0.83 64 
Morocco 0.3 0.13 1.55 0.04 -0.56 0.61 150 
Nigeria 0.89 0.18 5.77 -2.3 -1.07 -1.18 200 
South Africa 0.44 0.2 3.53 1.55 1.2 0.34 536 
Tunisia 0.15 0.03 0.29 -1.3 -1.11 -0.22 39 
Overall Mean 0.44 0.16 3.99 0.13 0.1 0.03 1574 
 
In terms of investment, Nigeria and Kenya has the highest investment rate (above the overall mean 
investment rate of 0.44) whereas Tunisia is the least. On sales growth, South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya are the 
highest (above the overall mean) and again Tunisia is the lowest. On cash flow, Nigerian and Egyptian companies 
have the highest cash flow and again Tunisian companies are the least. On financial development and stock market 
development measures, South Africa is a clear outlier whereas Nigeria has the lowest FD and Kenya has the lowest 
STKMKT. Finally on financial intermediary development Morocco, South Africa and Egypt have the highest values 
whereas Nigeria is the least. 
 
From these results, it can be seen that Nigeria has weak financial development. This may indicate that most 
financing may come from informal finance. The realities in Kenya are closer to Nigeria. The real sector is growing, 
but the financial sector especially stock markets are weak. Tunisia suffers from weak real sector development. South 
Africa has a developed financial system, but it is surprisingly surpassed by Morocco on financial intermediary 
development.  
 
Correlations 
 
Table 3 present the correlation among key variables to highlight any multicollinearity issue. 
 
Table 3. Correlation among Key Variables 
Variables Investment Sales Growth Cash Flow FD STKMKT FININT 
Investment 1 
     Sales Growth 0.1215** 1
    Cash Flow 0.4824** 0.0462 1
   FD -0.1158** 0.0416 -0.0384 1
  STKMKT -0.0761** 0.0661** -0.0319 0.9458** 1
 FININT -0.1526** -0.0078 -0.04 0.8516** 0.6352** 1
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Investment is positively and significantly correlated with sales growth and cash flow suggesting the accelerator effect and financing constraints 
respectively. Surprisingly, investment is negatively and significantly correlated with all of the financial development measures. Sales growth is not correlated 
with most of the variables except stock market development. Cash flow is not significantly correlated with any of the financial development measures.  
 
As expected the financial development measure is highly correlated with its components, stock market development and financial intermediary 
development. The two financial development components are also highly correlated indicating countries having developed banking system have a developed 
stock market or vice versa. In general, multicollinearity among the main explanatory variables such as sales growth, cash flow and FD measures is not an issue to 
be concerned about as the correlations are not high among these variables. 
 
Table 4. Econometric Estimation: The Effect of Cash Flow on Investment without and with FD measures interaction 
Variables 
Without 
Interaction CF* FD Interaction CF* STKMKT Interaction CF* FININT Interaction 
All CF Overall FD FD Sample Splits 
Overall 
STKMKT 
STKMKT 
Sample Splits 
Overall 
FININT 
FININT 
Sample Splits 
Coeff. P-val. Coeff. P-val. Coeff. P-val. Coeff. P-val. Coeff. P-val. Coeff. P-val. Coeff. P-val. 
Lagged investment 0.14 0.154 0.11 0.088 0.08 0.285 0.1 0.094 0.1 0.241 0.012 0.032** 0.1 0.223 
Ln Sales growth 0.03 0.263 0.03 0.143 0.02 0.275 0.03 0.162 0.02 0.316 0.02 0.154 0.01 0.82 
Cash flow 0.04 0.000** 0.05 0.000** 
  
0.05 0.000** 
  
0.049 0.000** 
  Cash flow * Overall FD 
  
-0.01 0.040** 
          Cash flow * Low FD 
    
0.09 0.000** 
        Cash flow * High  FD 
    
0.03 0.002** 
        Cash flow * Overall STKMKT 
      
-0.01 0.382 
      Cash flow * Low STKMKT 
        
0.04 0.009** 
    Cash flow * High STKMKT 
        
0.05 0.000** 
    Cash flow * Overall FININT 
          
-0.05 0.026** 
  Cash flow * Low FININT 
            
0.07 0.000** 
Cash flow * High FININT 
            
0.04 0.004** 
Difference between coefficients 
              CF Low FD/STKMKT/FININT = 
CF High FD/STKMKT/FININT 
 
 
 
   0.004**    0.536    0.040** 
Wald (p-value) 
 
0.000** 
 
0.000** 
 
0.000** 
 
0.000** 
 
0.000** 
 
0.000** 
 
0.000** 
Sargan (p-value) 
 
0.332 
 
0.228 
 
0.441 
 
0.294 
 
0.54 
 
0.2 
 
0.598 
AR (2) (p-value) 
 
0.771 
 
0.675 
 
0.997 
 
0.673 
 
0.675 
 
0.827 
 
0.586 
NT 854 
N 265 
Notes: Country and time dummies are included, but for brevity purpose the result is not reported. 
**significant at 5% 
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Econometric Results 
 
As highlighted in the methodology section the system GMM estimators are employed, which are more 
efficient than the difference GMM estimators. These estimators are relevant in our case since the lagged dependent 
variable is included in the model and some of the explanatory variables such as cash flow are not strictly exogenous.  
Before interpreting the main result, let us highlight the model adequacy results. The Wald statistics is significant 
indicating all the included variables jointly explain the investment behaviour of firms in the selected African 
countries. The Sargan test is insignificant indicating the included instruments of two lags are valid. The AR (2) test 
is also insignificant indicating there is no autocorrelation in the first difference residuals and thus no specification 
problem in the model. All standard errors are robust to address the issue of heteroskedasticity.  
 
Investment Equations without Interactions 
 
This equation is estimated with lagged investment, sales growth and cash flow as explanatory variables. 
The result indicated that lagged investment is not significant except in the model for cash flow interaction with the 
overall FININT. This indicates there is no persistence in the investment decision of firms. Current year investment 
doesn’t depend on what happened in last year. Other exogenous factors are affecting investment rather than internal 
decisions of the firms. Sales growth is also insignificant indicating demand for firms’ products is not the driving 
force behind firms’ investment. The main variable of interest to this research is cash flow and it is found to have a 
positive and significant effect on firm investment. A 10% increase in cash flow leads to a 4% increase in firm 
investment. According to Fazzari et al. (1988), such positive and significant cash flow coefficient shall be 
interpreted as evidence of financial constraints. But the caveats to such interpretation shall not be ignored. 
 
Investment Equations with FD Interactions 
 
In this equation, cash flow is interacted with the overall FD index and the FD sample splits (low and high 
FD categories). Like the previous result, the level cash flow term is again significant indicating a higher investment 
cash flow sensitivity, which can be interpreted as the existence of financing constraints in the overall sample. The 
cash flow interaction with overall FD shows a negative and significant coefficient. This indicates that financial 
development reduces the investment cash flow sensitivity coefficients, which are a measure of financing constraints.   
 
When the cash flow variable is interacted with the FD sample splits (low and high FD groups), the result 
indicates that firms in both low and high FD countries show significant and positive cash flow coefficient. This 
indicates that both groups of firms are financially constrained. This is not surprising in Africa where the overall 
financial development is too low and even makes firms in countries with high FD financially constrained. 
 
Furthermore, chi-square tests are conducted for any significant differences between the cash flow 
coefficients of low and high FD groups. The result shows that there is indeed significant difference (9% is greater 
than 3%) between the two groups. This indicates that firms in countries with high FD are less financially constrained 
than firms in countries with low FD. Such result reaffirms the original results of cash flow interaction with overall 
FD in that financial development indeed reduces financing constraints.  
 
Investment Equations with STKMKT Interactions 
 
Like the FD regressions, cash flow is interacted with the overall STKMKT index and the STKMKT sample 
splits (low and high STKMKT categories). The cash flow interaction with overall STKMKT shows a negative and 
insignificant coefficient. This indicates that stock market development does not have any role in the investment cash 
flow sensitivity coefficient and hence on reducing financing constraints.  
 
The cash flow interaction with STKMKT sample split (low and high STKMKT categories) result shows 
firms in both low and high STKMKT countries show positive and significant cash flow coefficient meaning they are 
financially constrained. This result is the same as the FD sample splits result. The chi-square test shows no 
significant difference between the two groups of low and high STKMKT. Such result reaffirms the original results 
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of cash flow interaction with overall STKMKT in that stock market development has no role in reducing financing 
constraints.  
 
Investment Equations with FININT Interactions 
 
The overall and sample split FININT regression results are the same as the FD result. The overall FININT 
regression result is significant and negative indicating the positive role of financial intermediary development in 
reducing financing constraints. Unlike the overall STKMKT regression which is insignificant, the overall FININT 
interaction is significant and negative.  
 
The FININT sample split result shows again both low and high FININT groups are financially constrained. 
Furthermore, there is significant difference between these two coefficients reaffirming the positive role of financial 
intermediary development in reducing financing constraints. 
 
Discussion 
 
Merging the result of the entire three models (FD, STKMKT and FININT), the following summary points 
can be made. First, the results indicate financial development reduces financing constraints. This is possible because 
financial development mitigates information asymmetry and contracting imperfections, which create a wedge 
between the cost of internal and external finance. Such result is consistent with many authors cited in the literature 
(Rajan & Zingales, 1998; Love, 2003; Becker and Sivandasany, 2010; Baum et al., 2011; Islam and Mozumdar, 
2007; Khurana et al., 2006; Semenov, 2006). Increased access to finance can be one of the possible channels 
through which financial development can bring positive effective on the economic growth of a country.  
 
Second, the positive role of financial development in reducing financing constraints is due to financial 
intermediary development rather than stock market development. This indicates that banks have better role in 
reducing information asymmetry. Besides, their role in monitoring and governance of firms is better than stock 
markets. Our results are consistent, but not exactly the same, with those found by Baum et al. (2011), Semenov 
(2006) and Tseng (2012). These authors found that firms in countries with dominantly market based financial 
system are more financially constrained than firms in bank based financial systems. Their result implies stock 
markets have a reduced role than banks in reducing firm financing constraints. Our result implies stock markets have 
no role at all. The difference between our results and theirs is the settings within which the studies are conducted. 
These studies are conducted in countries with developed stock markets where stock markets have some role in 
reducing financing constraints although not equal to that of banks. Our study is conducted in Africa where stock 
market development is at the infancy stage. Thus the no role of stock market is not that much surprising.  
 
Third, all firms in the different financial development categories and its component classifications are 
financially constrained. This indicates the financial development in many African countries is too low, which is not 
surprising. As a result, even firms in countries with high financial development are constrained.  This explanation is 
the same with the review of the African financial system explained by Allen et al. (2011), Misati & Nyamongo 
(2011) and Yartey and Adjasi (2007). 
 
Fourth, the chi-square result tells us firms in countries with low FD (FININT) are more financially 
constrained than firms in countries with high FD (FININT). This result reaffirms the positive role of financial 
development and financial intermediary development in reducing financing constraints found earlier. Thus the result 
is robust to alternative specification of overall financial development regression or sample splits. 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The role of financial development in economic growth is a highly contested topic in the economics and 
finance literature. One of the channels through which financial development can help a country’s economic growth 
is by alleviating firm financing constraints. In this connection, the current study addressed the effect of financial 
development in reducing firm level financing constraints and this will provide some evidence towards the larger 
debate on finance-growth nexus.  
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Financial development is measured as the sum of two components, stock market development and financial 
intermediary development, with each component measured using a set of their own variables. Financing constraints 
is measured using the sensitivity of investment to cash flow with higher sensitiveness interpreted as higher financing 
constraints. Data from 273 manufacturing firms from six African countries for a period of 7 years (2005-11) is used 
for the study. The African case is unique and important to investigate because no prior study addresses this issue in 
the region. Furthermore, the region has the lowest financial development by global standards and all type of firms 
are expected to bear the burden of financing constraints seriously. Checking such sort of hypothesis shed new light 
to the overall research tradition in this area. 
 
The result of this study clearly indicates financial development help to reduce firm level financial 
constraints. One of the ways in which financial development reduce financing constraints is by mitigating 
information asymmetry and contracting imperfections. From the components of financial development, banking 
development is found to have a positive role in reducing firm financing constraints whereas stock market 
developments have no role. Such result may be due to the relatively bank dominated financial system of many 
African countries. Stock market development is at the infancy stage. It needs to be developed much to have any 
meaningful effect on financing firms’ investment needs. The other interesting finding is that even firms in countries 
with high financial development (financial intermediary development) are financially constrained. This indicates 
that the African financial system is too weak even to the extent that such kinds of firms are highly constrained.  
 
The overall implication of our findings is that policy makers shall give due attention to overall financial 
sector development. Specifically factors that shape financial development of a country need to be given emphasis. 
For instance La Porta et al. (1997) showed that legal system indicators such as the efficiency of the legal system, the 
rule of law, the risk of expropriation and corruption are one of the critical determinants of a country’s financial 
development. Thus more political commitment is required to bring up those legal changes. Furthermore, in order to 
increase access to finance for firms the following improvements are needed in the African banking sector. Collateral 
requirements need to be lessened, relationship lending shall be promoted, the huge public sector presence needs to 
be reduced through privatizations, the banking sector should be liberalized and entry of foreign banks be allowed; 
regulatory measures need to be taken to create a competitive banking sector. Since the weak development of African 
stock markets is driving the insignificant results, more policy measures shall also be taken for stock market 
development. 
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